This study focuses on the degree of political dominance exercised on cabinets by the executive chief in presidential systems. According to a debate that began in the 1990s, presidential systems are characterized by a non-collegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president, in contrast to parliamentary systems where a joint decision-making process is prevalent. The key argument of this research note is that, although the majority of presidents have the constitutional power to remove cabinet ministers, the executive decision-making process in presidential systems is not necessarily vertical or based on a noncollegial process. By building a new index, we reveal a significant variation in the executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets. To classify the degree of political dominance of presidents over their cabinets, we analyzed the rules of cabinet decision-making processes as defined in 18 Latin American constitutions.
he debate on constitutional designs and decision-making processes of presidential systems re-emerged in modern political science due to the third wave of democracy (HUNTINGTON, 1993) . According to Carey (2005) , the third wave of democracy exposed certain important trends, such as the establishment of democratic regimes in countries with no previous democratic experience, re-establishment of democracy in countries that had experienced periods of authoritarian regimes, and the expansion of independent states after the collapse of Soviet and European communism. An important consequence of these has been the attention given to the constitutional rules regulating the competition and the exercise of political authority in a democracy.
Traditionally, presidential systems have been characterized as a noncollegial decision-making process, led by and personified in the figure of the president (LIJPHART, 1992; SARTORI, 1997) . By considering recent empirical comparative studies (AMORIM NETO, 2006; PAYNE, 2007) , we argue against the assumption that the president's power to remove ministers will lead to a verticalized or non-collegial decision-making process, and argue that this assumption underrates the variations that may exist within the degrees of presidential dominance over the cabinets. By building a new index that provides a greater understanding of the degree of presidential dominance over their cabinets in the decision-making process, our results reveal a significant variation in executive power exerted by presidents over their cabinets. Moreover, our analysis of the variation of presidential dominance over cabinets in 18 Latin American constitutions allows us to classify the decision-making processes of the executive branch as decentralized to the benefit of ministers' powers, shared between ministers and the president, or centralized in the figure of the president.
If the institutional theory is correct that it is possible to predict political phenomena by considering the effects of rules on the behavior of individuals, it is reasonable to expect that different cabinets' rules can lead to different decisionmaking processes in presidential governments. The costs of a presidential decision to remove ministers, for example, may vary depending on other institutional factors such as rules that empower ministers. It may also vary according to other political factors, such as whether a minister's party is the pivotal actor in maintaining the coalition in the legislature (FORTUNATO and STEVENSON, 2013) . Furthermore, the T Victor Araújo, Thiago Silva & Marcelo Vieira (2016) 10 (2) e0007 -3/23 distribution of resources for policy-making in the cabinet is directly related to the degree of influence the parties can exert on the composition of the executive agenda (ARAÚJO, 2016) . Thus, the variation of how powerful the president is, vis-à-vis the cabinet, is of fundamental importance to enhancing our understanding of presidents' powers over their cabinets.
In the next section we briefly review the literature on presidential systems;
in the third section we explore the puzzle that guides this study, and we present our argument; in the fourth section we develop our index and present the data and method used in our analysis; in the fifth section we present and discuss our preliminary findings, and; in the concluding section we present our final comments.
Literature Review
According to Elgie (2005) , it is possible to identify at least three stages of the debate on presidential systems in the comparative politics literature. In the first stage, the classical Linzian argument prevails, in which Linz (1978) argues that parliamentary systems are superior to presidential systems, due to parliamentary systems offering greater political stability and decision-making capacity. Linz (1990 Linz ( , 1994 argues that the independent election of the president and the legislators in a presidential system would lead to recurring conflicts between these actors, and would lead the presidents to claiming a greater democratic legitimacy for themselves, as the nation's representative. Moreover, argue Shugart and Carey (1992) , presidentialism also presents the perilous fact that presidents represent both the state and the government and have a fixed term that is independent of parliamentary confidence.
The arguments of Mainwaring (1993) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) greatly influence the second stage of the debate on presidential systems. According to these authors, the problem does not reside in presidentialism itself, but in the combination of a presidential system with a highly fragmented legislature. In other words, the problem would result from the combination of presidentialism with a multiparty system in the institutions adopted in the newborn democracies in Latin
America. According to Mainwaring (1993) , in a system of government that is guided by non-cooperative incentives between the executive and legislative powers-a system which consequently offers no incentive for the formation of coalitions- and CASTIGLIONI, 2010; AMORIM NETO, 2006; CHASQUETTI, 2001; CHEIBUB, 2002; CHEIBUB, PRZEWORSKI and SAIEGH, 2004; DEHEZA, 1997; MEJÍA ACOSTA, 2009; NEGRETTO, 2006; ZELAZNIK, 2001 ).
From the above literature, we learned that: i. Although there are differences regarding the conditions of the governmental structure, the decision-making process in presidential and parliamentary systems of government may share similar characteristics (CHEIBUB, 2007; CHEIBUB, ELKINS and GINSBURG, 2014; TSEBELIS, 1995) , and; ii. Potential analytical gains can be achieved when analyses overlook the differences between regimes, and consider instead intra-government scheme variations (EATON, 2000) .
The empirical evidence that allows us to infer that the variable "system of government" is unable to adequately predict policy outcomes in presidential democracies is the same evidence that causes us to rethink the rules that structure the decision-making process in these democracies.
Models that predict how cabinets work and how their policy-making processes are defined should be evaluated empirically (ELGIE, 1997), instead of inferring results from assumed expectations. Moreover, in contrast to the idea that the decision-making processes in parliamentary and presidential cabinets are dichotomous, we should evaluate the possibility that the power-sharing among government members varies on a continuous scale (ANDEWEG, 1985 (ANDEWEG, , 1988 (ANDEWEG, , 1997 BARBIERI, 2003; KEMAN, 2006; VERCESI, 2012) .
From this perspective, it is possible to capture through empirical comparative analysis intra-system variations based on the president's degree of dominance over the cabinet. Instead of accepting the argument that the decision-
making process in the cabinet within presidential systems has an inherently vertical character, with the presidents at the top and the ministers at the bottom (AMORIM NETO, 2006; LIJPHART, 1992; SARTORI, 1997) , in this study we argue that there is a wide variation between cases and within cases with regard to presidential powers over cabinets in Latin America.
Thus, even when we consider that the president has the prerogative to dismiss ministers in the majority of presidential contexts, it does not automatically follow that presidents are plenipotentiary in relation to the decision-making process of the government cabinet. In other words, we cannot automatically imply that: i. All presidential constitutions grant the president vertical control over the cabinets, or;
ii. That the power to select and remove ministers implies that the presidential power over ministers is unrestricted or unbounded. (LIJPHART, 1992; LINZ, 1994; SARTORI, 1997; SHUGART and CAREY, 1992; VERNEY, 1992) .
Presidents
According to Lijphart (1992) , the distinctiveness of government systems is defined in terms of mutually exclusive factors. In presidentialism, the head of government has a constitutionally-established fixed term, and cannot be, under normal conditions, removed from power by the legislature. Also, presidential systems have one person, a non-collegial executive, and the head of government is elected directly (or in some cases indirectly, such as in the United States) by the voters. In parliamentary systems, the head of government-usually called the prime minister-is selected by the legislature and can be removed by a legislative vote of no confidence or by censure. In this system, the prime minister and the cabinet form a collective executive body which has a collegial decision-making process.
One of the main contributions of Lijphart (1992) The second problem of the Lijphartian definition (1992), and the focus of our study, is the argument that presidents, unlike prime ministers in a parliamentary system, exert a vertical control over the executive branch. Lijphart's argument (1992) assumes that there is a hierarchical relationship between the chief executive and the cabinets in every presidential system. This argument is supported by Sartori (1997) when he states that "the line of authority [in presidential systems] is neatly streamlined from the president down" (Sartori, p. 84) .
Granted, several presidential constitutions define cabinet members as heads of ministries or public agencies, and "mere" presidential advisers. Constitution also states that the president must obtain the support of all ministers to request emergency powers.
According to Amorim Neto (2006) , the aforementioned constitutional articles show that from a formal point of view Lijphart (1992) would be incorrect in assuming that the absence of collegial decision-making rules is a defining and universal feature of presidentialism. However, from a substantive point of view, the fact that the president has power to dismiss his ministers at any time leads Amorim Neto (2006) to agree with Lijphart (1992) and Sartori (1997) , arguing that the president's power to dismiss her ministers verticalizes the president's relationship In this research note, we argue that the president powers to select and remove ministers do not automatically imply a non-collegial or a vertical decisionmaking process in presidential systems. By building a new index, we reveal evidence of intrasystem variations in presidential influence over cabinets.
An Index on Chief Executive Power over Cabinets
In this section, we present the research design and the data we used, and
we develop an index to help scholars analyze how powerful the president is vis-à-vis the cabinet, according to specific constitutional rules that verticalize or horizontalize the decision-making processes of the executive power in Latin American democracies.
Although the relationship between political actors is more complex than the analysis of formal rules within constitutions, there are at least two advantages in considering the formal rules of the decision-making process within the executive branch. First, the analysis of the constitutions enables the comparison of cases in time and space, allowing a greater number of democracies to be investigated.
Second, given that the main inferences about presidentialism are based on typologies formulated by the analysis of formal rules, analyzing these constitutions allows an evaluation of these arguments using evidence from the current literature.
Moreover, as stated by Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg (2014) , by focusing on constitutions we tie "our analysis of institutional design to an identifiable activity and mode of behavior-constitution making-and thereby keep the process in sight.
Importantly, we know who did what and when" (CHEIBUB, ELKINS and GINSBURG, 2014, p. 525) .
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Research design and data
Whereas our sources for the classification of formal rules are the constitutions themselves, validity does not appear to be a problem in our measurement and comparison of formal rules. However, reliability issues-that is, issues of conceptual and measurement equivalence-emerge when comparing the constitutions of different countries (ELKINS, 2010). The problem in comparing different constitutions is the lack of systematic classification of the constitutional texts.
In order to deal with the problem of comparability and reliability of the constitutional texts, in our analysis we used the data collected and classified by the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) 2 (ELKINS, MELTON and GINSBURG, 2015) . This project was developed with the goal of improving-temporally and spatially-the efficiency and systematization of the information contained in different constitutions (ELKINS, 2013; .
In an attempt to measure the degree of presidential governmental dominance, we have taken into account five decision rules: 01. Cabinet removal;
02. Cabinets' selection procedures; 03. The restrictions of eligibility for the office of minister; 04. The minister's countersignature for executive decisions, and; 05.
The legislative powers of ministers.
These decision rules come from a conceptual framework developed and refined by the CCP investigators that includes over 600 attributes of constitutions. This framework was then converted to a guided survey instrument, which CCP coders used to read, interpret and compare the constitutional texts (ELKINS et al., 2014, p. 12) . Therefore, regarding each of these rules as they appear in our analysis, the procedure for cabinet removal is the set of rules that limits or increases the presidential autonomy to dismiss cabinet ministers. If there are no limits to presidential autonomy, the cost of removing cabinet ministers is lower for the president, and consequently, presidential dominance over the cabinets will be greater. This variable is measured as a binary variable, where a value of 01 is assigned to the rule of the president to freely remove the ministers, and a value of 0 is assigned in those cases where the power of the president to remove ministers is limited (for example, when the president needs the support of other political actors to remove ministers).
Cabinet selection indicates whether the president can freely appoint her cabinet ministers or if there is any institutional rule that limits this power (for example, whether the president needs the ratification by other political actors regarding the ministers appointed). If the presidential nomination is free, the dominance exercised by the chief executive is greater. This binary variable is assigned a value of 1 when the president is free to appoint her ministers, or it is assigned a value of 0 if there is a rule conditioning the presidential appointment.
Restrictions on eligibility for the cabinet offices indicate that ministers need to meet certain requirements to be appointed by the president. The greater the number of restrictions on eligibility, the cost of presidential ministerial replacement is greater, and consequently, the influence of the president over the cabinets will be smaller. This binary variable receives a value of 0 in the presence of restrictions (beyond minimum age and nationality), and a value of 1 in the absence of this rule.
The requirement of a ministerial counter-signature for executive decisions indicates a collegial character between the cabinet and the president, Argentina ( The second measurement strategy highlighted by Fortin (2013) has its origin in Duverger (1980) , and consists of potential formal powers that can be attributed to presidents. From this measurement strategy, scholars have created indices of presidential powers, most commonly comprised of binary variables that are coded on the existence (or nonexistence) of the above powers. Several aggregated indices are based on this strategy, such as the indices suggested by Lucky (1993) , Frye (1997) , Siaroff (2003) , and Armingeon and Careja (2007) , in addition to the presidential power index proposed by Doyle and Elgie (2015) .
These authors suggest an index that combines 28 categories in a comparative and local perspective, in addition to considering a larger time series compared to the previous cited studies.
The index proposed in our study fits into the second measurement strategy of presidential powers, as described above. This index reflects our perception that the current measurements produced by the literature do not adequately measure the phenomenon addressed in this study. Also, this index is justified by its parsimony-taking into consideration five categories-which makes it easy to understand and replicable. Another justification is its homogeneity, because all the categories considered in this index are related to the power sharing between the president and the members of the executive cabinet. Thus, this index avoids the criticism of Fortin (2013) , who argues against existing indices that include legislative powers and non-legislative powers in the same index.
Analysis
The examination of presidential dominance over cabinets based on our index will be explained by an in-depth, descriptive analysis of the 18 selected constitutions. Through our analysis we explore the dispersion and central tendency of the aforementioned rules. Where appropriate and necessary, we will explore the specific information through graphics and tables. In Figure 01 , for example, we depict the degree of presidential dominance over cabinets in the current constitutions of our selected 18 Latin American countries.
As we can see in Figure 01 , Bolivia presents the most "horizontal" According to the Brazilian Constitution, the only limitation to the dominance of the president over the cabinet is the requirement of a countersignature from the ministers. The president's actions and decrees must be countersigned by the ministers of state, who also have the power to dispatch instructions on the enforcement of laws, decrees and regulations.
Results and Discussion
From our analysis of the variation of presidential dominance over Therefore, it can be argued that Lijphart's argument (1992) that the vertical character of presidentialism opposes the collegial character of parliamentary systems, which was accepted by Sartori (1997) , Amorim Neto (2006) , and the consolidated literature on presidential systems, cannot be sustained. The degree of dominance exercised by the chief executive on the cabinets has at least three distinct patterns if we take into account the current constitutions of the 18 selected Latin American countries with presidential systems. The variation in the dominance rate of the presidents in the executive decision-making process ranges from 0 to 4, and corroborates our argument that Latin American presidential constitutions centralize the responsibilities to compose and administrate the government in the presidency, and that we cannot automatically imply that, i. All presidential constitutions are necessarily vertical, or ii. That the power to select and remove the ministers makes the presidential power over ministers unrestricted or unbounded.
A possible counter-argument, in favor of the Lijphartian (1992) argument that has been consolidated by the mainstream comparative analysis on presidential systems, could be that, of the 18 countries analyzed in our study, eight feature indices with the same value, which could explain the low value of the standard deviation. However, the same value for our index in these countries hides important differences within these cases. The fact that Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic and Ecuador, for example, were assigned an index equal to 3, does not mean that Chilean, Colombian, Dominican and Ecuadorian presidents have the same restrictions on the selection and removal of ministers, on their options to select their ministers, on the requirement of ministerial countersignature, or on the prerogative to initiate legislative proposals. There is variability in the rules that compose our index among the countries assigned with the same values.
As can be seen in Table 01 below, the distribution of countries according to each verticalization (+) or horizontalization (-) factor that composes our index varies significantly among the constitutions analyzed in this study. Lastly, when we analyze which constitutions grant the president the prerogative to initiate legislation within the executive branch, we found a significant variation. Nearly half of the constitutions analyzed in this study empower the president with the prerogative to initiate laws. The other half provides either coauthoring capabilities to ministers to propose bills, or even the autonomous power to legislate. The presidents of Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, for example, are actors with exclusive power to legislate within the executive branch, yet on the Argentine, Dominican and Uruguayan presidents do not have this prerogative. In eight countries-including Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Uruguay-the ministers have legislative powers that are ensured by the constitution.
Final Comments
According to Lijphart's argument (1992) , which was supported by Sartori government, presidential constitutions would make ministers submissive to the presidents. In other words, the executive decision-making process would be seen as a vertical process dominated by the president. However, as we have revealed in this research note, this argument lacks consistency when empirically confronted. There are significant costs in the presidential acts of selecting, removing and replacing ministers, and its costs can vary depending on the rules and contexts that empower the chief executive and her ministers. In the development of our index, five of these rules were considered: cabinet removal, cabinet selection, eligibility of ministers, countersignature of ministers, and legislative powers of ministers.
The analysis based on our index revealed significant variations of presidential dominance over cabinets in Latin American presidential constitutions.
We inferred at least three clear standards: Presidential democracies can have 01.
Decentralized, 02. Shared, or 03. Centralized executive decision-making processes.
Moreover, according to our index, regarding the executive powers of the president vis-à-vis cabinet ministers, we revealed a great variance across countries. In sum, regarding the decision-making process, presidential systems are not necessarily vertical, and presidential powers over ministers are not necessarily unrestricted or unbounded.
The next steps of this research include analyzing in more detail how each of the rules that compose our index works, and increasing the number of countries analyzed and their respective constitutions. Thus, we will be able to increase the number of our observations, and capture possible differences between presidential, parliamentary and hybrid constitutions associated with constitutional delegation and decision-making processes.
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